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## PRESIDENTIAL ORATORY IN ACTION THE EGYPTIAN UPRISING AS A RHETORICAL WAR

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### ABSTRACT

This article studies the most significant discursive tactics used in the Egyptian ousted president Hosni Mubarak's addresses during the January 2011 Uprising. It analyses in detail four types of discursive tactics that has been used to end the uprising, or at least reduce the scope of its effects: controlling the context of the three addresses, language choice, techniques of self-praise, and representations of past and future scenarios. In such a framework, a number of discourse features are studied, including address production processes, style variation, pronoun distribution, metaphorical construction of the future, audio performance of the addresses, and the immediate responses of samples of the Egyptian audiences to Mubarak's discourse. The article argues that these discursive tactics played a crucial role in the course of events of the Egyptian uprising, which can't be comprehended in isolation from the relationship between the discourses of the protestors, on the one hand, and the changes in the balance of power between the regimes and the protestors, on the other.

**Keywords:** Discourse tactics, argumentation, pronouns, metaphor, Hosni Mubarak, political speeches, Critical Discourse Studies, Arab Spring.

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If war is the most violent face of politics, then social uprising is its most innocent one. The Egyptian uprising set the stage for a war between the rhetoric of the existing regime and that of the revolutionary forces. Both of these forces have been engaged in a battle of persuasion and influence to displace the other and control the arena of discourse. The scope of such an arena, which has been widened by the uprising, encompasses television channels, newspapers, radio stations, personal interviews, seminars, streets, walls of houses, light poles, and the tops of military tanks. This research will attempt to explore and analyze the tactics of the soft forces of power in the arena of the Egyptian Uprising.

The three addresses that Hosni Mubarak gave during the initial uprising were regarded as the spearhead of his regime in its struggle with the protestors. His presidential addresses were seen as iconic representations of the entire regime, bearing all of its attributes and features. They also exercised a pivotal role on the stage of the Egyptian uprising, having a great influence in directing its path. Moreover, the addresses determined the 'rules and regulations' of the discourse tactics that guide those who produce the discourse of the authority in power on the level of the public masses and especially in the official media.

This article addresses the most significant discursive tactics used in Mubarak's addresses,

which attempted to end the uprising, or at least reduce the scope of its effects. It analyses in detail four types of tactics: controlling the context and distribution of the three addresses, their language, techniques of self-praise, and representations of past and future scenarios. In such a framework, a number of discourse phenomena are studied, including address production processes, style variation, pronoun distribution, metaphorical images of the future, audio performance of the addresses, and immediate responses of samples of the Egyptian audiences to Mubarak's discourse. The article argues that these tactics played a crucial role in the course of events of the Egyptian uprising, which can't be comprehended in isolation from the relationship between the discourses of the protestors, on the one hand, and the changes in the balance of power between the regimes and the protestors, on the other.

**Who holds the thread of discourse? controlling the contexts of discourse production and distribution**

The three addresses consist of 2,750 words, last no longer than 39 minutes, and constitute the entire address that the former Egyptian president Hosni Mubarak made directly to the Egyptian people on the revolutionary uprising against his regime on January 25, 2011 until he "gave up power" on February 11, 2011. The few words delivered on January 28, February 1, and February 10, respectively, had a great influence on the course of events, directing them in favor of or against the existing power. They will thus represent the most vivid and enduring rhetorical utterances in the memory of those who witnessed such historic moments.

All three addresses were pre-recorded, rather than delivered to a live audience or live on air<sup>i</sup>. Thus there was a time gap between the addresses' production and their broadcast, which Mubarak sought to manipulate to his advantage.

Mubarak usually sticks to prepared written texts. He rarely improvises or speaks directly to an audience. This tendency can be attributed to his relatively weak communication skills or the severe tone that often marks his improvised words<sup>ii</sup>. Sticking to this rhetorical style reduces the exorbitant cost of diverting from the original text;

especially in extremely sensitive situations such as during the uprising, when words can have an enormous effect on events. In addition, address recording uses montage techniques, which allow for the production and synthesis of multiple copies of the same event and their synthesis to minimize negative aspects and only include the positive aspects. As a form of political communication, recorded addresses not only allow politicians to control the context of discourse production but also the context of its broadcast through managing how and when it will be aired.

Dominating the context of discourse distribution has been a difficult objective for politicians for a long time. Authoritarian orators, such as, Adolf Hitler used to speak to his audience when they were extremely exhausted, such as after long, tiring celebrations or hours of strenuous work. When the body is exhausted, its muscles relax and the individual becomes unable to think critically and becomes a passive receptor of information (Hatim: p. 570-571). This passive receptivity is indeed the ultimate goal for an authoritarian politician, because the audience who accepts whatever he hears is the best in a political context in which domination and control are the sole goal.

The impact of the audience's physical condition on processing discourses has been studied in Cognitive Psychology. Studies show that ideological shifting could be facilitated by dominating the psychological circumstances surrounding the audience of the discourse meant to persuade them (Abdullah p. 23 -151). An important conclusion of these studies is that audiences are more likely to be affected by a discourse when their critical mental ability is paralyzed by fear or mental or physical exhaustion, which prevent them from thinking or responding critically. When individuals reach such a state, they tend to receive information without questioning it, even if it contradicts deeply-rooted beliefs.

Mubarak's address on January 28<sup>th</sup> benefited from some of the circumstances that is ideal for brainwashing. Though the address was recorded early in the day, it was not released until late at night. It accompanied the fear campaign that began with the release of prisoners and gunshots in

streets across Cairo. Let alone the horrified calls for rescue, which cannot be part of the most horrifying scary movies, and the rumors circulated to terrify people. In addition to this state of panic, many Egyptians were in a state of utter physical exhaustion after demonstrating or following the demonstrations all day and spending hours of a chilly January night on the streets to protect their properties. Another important factor was the long period between the announcement that Mubarak would address the nation and the address itself hours later. During this period, Egyptians' hearts and minds were taunted by the continuous promise that the president would give an address "soon" and analysts' predictions of what the address would include. Finally, after hearts and minds were sufficiently primed, the president's address put the paralyzing seeds in the souls of the anxious audience. All these factors resulted in an utter domination of the discourse distribution context over the audience's hearts and minds.

Mubarak's regime was keen to harness not only the contexts of discourse production and distribution, but also the structure of the language to grant the existing authority the utmost influence. This requires further elucidation.

#### **Modern standard Arabic and Egyptian colloquial Arabic: The conflict between the power of authorization and the power of political discourse**

The use of standard Arabic is a common characteristic of the three addresses, which follows Hisham Sharabi's hypothesis that autocratic Arab regimes employ the standard language to convey their paternalistic role (Sharabi, p.105-106). In addition to standard Arabic, the addresses used some structures and expressions from classical Arabic<sup>iii</sup>. Those instances appear in sensitive parts of the addresses, such as the structure "*La democateyyaatan haqqaqat, wa la istiqraran hafazat*"<sup>iv</sup> (lit. Neither democracy achieved, nor stability attained) in the January 28 address. That structure was used in the context of threatening Egyptians with chaos if the protestors did not refrain from protesting. Classical structures can also be detected in the February 1 address, in which Mubarak used the *afta'el* form of the verb *nawa* (lit. to have the intention) in his famous sentence

denying his intention to run for president in the upcoming elections: "I did not have any intention of becoming a candidate for the next presidential elections. "Classical expressions can also be found in the February 10 address, when Mubarak said, "It is embarrassing, very embarrassing, and shameful, so shameful." He puts emphasis on the element of shame when portraying relinquishing his powers as a shameful submission to foreign intervention in Egypt's domestic affairs.

These structures are used to perform particular functions in their respective contexts. For example, the verb 'Antawi' (lit. have the intention) is unfamiliar to the ordinary Egyptian audience, which leads to ambiguity and a gap in meaning that allow myriad interpretations that perform different pragmatic functions. The most important of these functions is Mubarak's saving face by emphasizing that his intention not to run for president preceded the uprising. Other possible interpretations perform the pragmatic function of keeping the doors open for the president to revisit that 'intention' if the uprising failed.

The structure "neither democracy achieved, nor stability attained" creates a rhythm resulting from the assonance and syntactic symmetry of the structure. That kind of musicality distracts the listener from thinking critically about the sentence's implication that democracy and stability cannot coexist. The sentence thus performs the pragmatic function of a threat by suggesting that the call for freedom would necessarily lead to "relapse to chaos and deterioration." Likewise, the repetition in expressions such as "embarrassment, all embarrassment" is used to place emphasis on that expression, which is repeated in different formulations nine times throughout the three addresses.

Speakers often employ the excessive use of complex structures for emphasis with the aim of bridging the confidence gap between speaker and audience. This explains why the last address, by which time the trust gap between Mubarak and a wide range of Egyptians had already deepened, is rich in emphatical techniques. Six variations of the structure "So, all so" are used extensively in the first two paragraphs of the address. Those are *ta'alamt*

*kol al'alam, aseft kol ala'saf, a'zem kol al azem, haris kol al hers, al harag kol al harag, ala'yeb kol al a'ayeb'* (lit. painful, all pain; sorrowful, all sorrow; determined, all determination; keen, all keenness; embarrassed, all embarrassment, ashamed, all shame),

The addressee in the first two addresses is the Egyptian people in general, as inferred from the frequently used vocative structure (i.e., citizens, brothers and sisters) that recurred in the first and third addresses three times, and twice in the second address. Throughout the three addresses, the vocative structure performs the function of connecting the different parts of the address. However, the address reflects a change in its addressee, as the opening of the address is *'al ekhwa al muwatenoona al abna'a shabbab misr'* (Citizens, sons and daughters, the youths of Egypt)

That opening was followed directly by the use of a declarative restrictive clause shifting the attention from *'al ekhwa al muwatenoona'* (citizens, brothers and sisters) to *'al abnaa'* (sons and daughters) as the main addressee of the address. With that shift, the addressees are given prominence as in: (Today, I address the Egyptian youth in Tahrir Square and everywhere in the land of Egypt; I pour my heart out to you all as a father talking to his sons and daughters)

With the trust gap between the 'fatherly president figure' and 'the Egyptian youths' so deep, many emphatic techniques were used in an attempt to bridge that gap. One of the most significant of those was the structure *'so, all so'*.

Borrowing expressions from classical Arabic that can be traced back to Egyptian political heritage, such as *'Al inzilaq, al intikass, antawi'* 'retrogression, deterioration, intention,' plays an important practical role in creating denotational obscurity in specific parts of the address. In addition, the use of classical Arabic highlights the established links between the political regime of Egypt and classical Arabic, contributing to a hierarchy that helps the regime achieve its objectives<sup>vi</sup>. The difference between the classical Arabic used by the regime and the colloquial Arabic used by the ordinary people in the streets reflects and reinforces the differences between the ruling regime and the

society. Whereas the first is characterized by an elevated status, the latter is looked down upon as a deformed byproduct of the first and therefore, deserving of a submissive role dependence rather than forceful independence.

In contrast, the protesters expressed themselves in colloquial Arabic. Most of the banners, slogans, jokes and songs were expressed in so-called street language, making them direct, clear and easy to understand and eliminating any room for obscurity, or over-interpretations. Pierre Bourdieu suggests that political discourse gains its power from the power of 'authorization' possessed by the speaking politician, that is, the authority he possesses by virtue of his position or status (Bagura, p.188-190), such as the authority of the presidency in this case. It is clear that the words of the protesters, who lack such authority, can only gain it through the revolutionary meanings that they produce or the physical power represented by the size of their protests and strikes. It could also be argued that the act of initiating an uprising is, in itself, an attempt to seize that power from the ruler. On the level of political discourse, there are several areas of conflict between the existing authority and the protesters. The use of standard Arabic as opposed to the colloquial represents an area of conflict in terms of the levels of language. In addition, addresses as the main genre of discourse used by the regime stand in contrast to other genres of discourse used by the protesters such as slogans, jokes, songs, caricatures, graphics, posters and leaflets. The context of communication is another area of conflict; Mubarak's formal communication is characterized by seriousness while popular forms of communication are serious yet cheerful, amounting to a farce in some cases. Finally, the content of the discourse is an area of conflict between a ruler who praises himself and hails his 30 years of achievements and protestors who criticize the regime and turn almost every positive quality on its head<sup>vii</sup>. This form of conflict is the focus of the detailed investigation that follows.

#### **Self-praise and the indirect strategies criticizing the protestors' discourses**

In his seminal study on oratory, Aristotle (384–322 BCE) identifies three modes of proof—

*ethos* (argumentation based on the perceived character of the speaker), *pathos* (appealing to audiences' emotions), and *logos* (utilizing rational arguments) (Aristotle, 29-30). Addresses utilize these modes in varying degrees depending on their goals. An academic lecture given to an audience of scientists might depend on evidence and proof, whereas religious sermons often use emotion rather than reason.

In this research, I argue that political discourses aiming at resisting the calls for toppling a ruling regime tend to use the perceived character of the speaker (*ethos*) to affect the audience emotionally. The aim in this case is to gain public support for the measures he uses to resist his opponents, offer legitimacy for remaining in power, and turn those protestors into offenders with no credibility through hidden polemic. According to Bakhtin, hidden polemic is achieved when the speaker's discourse launches a critical campaign on an opponent's discourse without referring directly to it (Bakhtin, P 195 – 197). I argue also that self-praise in political discourse, as Mubarak does, involves what Bakhtin calls "hidden dialogicality" (Bakhtin 197 – 200); that is, discourses become a battlefield for the discourse of the regime and that of the protestors.

Studying self-praise in Mubarak's discourse is significant. Uprisings that aim to sever the relation between a ruler and his people focus on the character of the ruler, who becomes an icon for the whole regime. The most lethal weapon used by the ruler, who is often targeted by the protestors, is his political addresses through which he resists his demonization. The more a ruler is disfigured, the more he will use self-praise discourse. Self-praise is a common element in Mubarak's three addresses, though there are variations in the space it occupies and the adjectives he uses to describe himself. The rhetorical functions of self-praise vary largely from one address to another. This requires a detailed illustration.

The language of self-praise forms 31% of the total lexis of the three addresses (854 words out of 2750). This includes all the sentences in which Mubarak emphasizes a positive trait of himself (such as: I spent my life protecting this country and its

sovereignty), refutes negative traits (such as: I never sought power or wealth), attributes a positive achievement exclusively to himself (such as: I did and will realize many things for the poor in this country), or describes a personal feeling of 'heroic' actions (such as: the best day in my life was that day I raised the flag of Egypt over Sinai). Three aspects pertinent to self-praise in the three addresses will be discussed in detail.

#### **Discourse exploitation: when protestors' demands become the regimes' accomplishments**

The first aspect related to self-praise is when the president equates his previous policies with the protestors' demands. During the first days of the uprising, popular social and economic demands were represented by the slogan "dignity, freedom, and social justice". These demands were then included in the January 28<sup>th</sup> address as presidential accomplishments rather than protestors' concerns. In his address, Mubarak portrayed himself as the most capable of understanding the people's aspirations: "I can understand such legitimate aspirations of the people. I also know quite well the pains and sufferings of such people...I was never away from them...and I work every day to elevate them..." He also claimed that he had worked for a long time to meet the protestors' requirements: "I have long stood by the poor and I have been keen to control the government economic reform policies so that they would not add to the suffering of the people." He will go on pursuing the same policy because, "I am constantly set on pursuing the social, economic and political reform to build a free democratic Egyptian society that would embrace the values of the age and would be opened to the universe."

Mixing the protestors' discourse with the discourse of the very regime they oppose embodies a phenomenon that has not yet attracted researchers' attention--discourse theft, by which the political discourse of an existing authority steals the most popular statements of the protestors' discourse. This tactic seeks to diminish the popularity of the opponents' discourse and compel them either to use less popular statements or to stick to the same ones which will no longer become exclusive or popular. To realize the goal of this

phenomenon, such statements should be presented as an authentic outcome and an indispensable part of the existing authority. No direct reference is thus made to the opponents' discourse on circulating such statements, which, in essence, belongs to it.

Through discourse theft, political, economic and social demands became "past accomplishments" that the president is proud of, rather than "future aspirations" the protestors seek to realize. The self-praise achieved by employing the opponents' discourse not only portrays the president in a positive light but also renders the protestors' demands illegitimate and radical threats to the future of the nation.

This trend is always accompanied by the second aspect of self-praise, praising the personal traits of the president.

#### **The rhetorical functions of praising personal traits**

"Shouldering the foremost responsibility" tops the list of the personal traits with which Mubarak praises himself in his addresses. The concluding statement in the January 28 address crystallizes the concept: "I reiterate that I am not going to be lax in making any decisions that preserve for each and every Egyptian man and woman their security and safety, and I shall defend Egypt's security, its stability and its people's wishes. This is the responsibility and the trust endowed, for which I have sworn an oath before God and the nation to shoulder and safeguard." This statement is a classic example of the rhetorical power of self-praise. It performs two speech acts: menacing and intimidating the protestors—but the threat and intimidation have been disguised by Mubarak's patriotism and personal virtues.

The January 28 address depicts the protests as "riots that threaten the public safety and obstruct the daily life of citizens." It assures the public that all possible measures were taken to terminate those protests "in defense of Egypt's safety and stability and its people's wishes" on one hand, and in the name of the shouldered responsibility and the endowed trust, on the other. Thus, self-praise is transformed into a rhetorical means of incitement against the demonstrators.

The February 1 address similarly employs the tactic of "shouldering the foremost

responsibility" to achieve certain rhetoric goals. Calls for stepping down soared when the police apparatus collapsed and the army took an unaligned stance towards the uprising. One of the strategies Mubarak employed to rebut those calls was extolling his personal traits. He said, for instance, "I am one of the sons of the armed forces, and it is not in my nature to breach the trust or to give up responsibility." Employing such techniques of self-praise gives his clinging to power an ethical hue. His grip on power becomes an act of loyalty to the trust endowed in him and an execution of duty at a time when calls for his resignation were condemned as incitement to betrayal. By connecting staying in power with shouldering military responsibility, Mubarak quotes the calls to step down with high treason.

While the trait of "shouldering the foremost responsibility" dominates the January 28 address, the trait of "renouncing the pleasures of sovereignty" is widely used in the following addresses. In the February 1 address, Mubarak praises himself, saying "I have never, ever been seeking power or prestige." He follows this with a statement that he did not intend to stand for the presidential elections, because "I have spent enough time of my life in serving Egypt and its people." He reiterates almost the same message in the February 10 address but with more details, saying: "I have never, ever sought power or any fake popularity," and "I have expressed with all clarity my intention not to stand for the forthcoming elections. I am content with the effort I have actually deployed in this country for more than 60 years during times of peace and war."

The image of the ruler who denounces power is a basic ingredient of traditional Arab political rhetoric, whose objective is to conceal a blazing avidity to stay in power eternally under a thick veil of rhetoric. It is not immediately clear why this image appeared only gradually from nonexistence in the January 28 address to persistence in the February 10 address. This transition was the result of the change in the relation between Mubarak's discourse and those of the protestors as well as the change in the weight of political forces in reality.

Insistence on the trait of “renouncing power” is an aspect of a hidden dialogue held with the protesters, a rebuttal of their discourse that contained torrential criticism of Mubarak’s grip on power and his desire to bequeath it to his family. The criticism was often scathing and outspoken, and it was expressed in heavily sarcastic literary styles such as caricature, jokes and graphics. It emerged after January 28, before which their discourse focused mainly on demanding political, economic and social reforms.

Repeating praises of “renouncing power” is, indeed, denying the fact of being fond of it. Political discourse often ignores accusations when possible, because refutation is a confirmation and a catalyst for further accusations as the January 28 address demonstrates. Ignoring the accusations was no longer possible given their rapid distribution and their growing influence in rallying new segments of society against Mubarak. His regime had no choice but to respond to the protesters’ discourse, which illustrates what Ronald Krebs and Patrick Jackson call “rhetorical coercion”.

Rhetorical coercion "occurs when this strategy proves successful: when the claimant’s opponents have been talked into a corner, compelled to endorse a stance they would otherwise reject" (Krebs & Jackson, p.36). The protesters drastically increased their influence between January 29 and February 1. Their success in organizing the first million-person gathering, the positive effect on security of popular committees, and the non-aligned stance on the part of the armed forces were all factors that allowed the protesters to widen the scope of their discourses and demands. Accordingly, Mubarak’s regime was cornered and unable to ignore the protesters or to distort their statements. There was no alternative but to submit to the rhetorical coercion and compromise by promising to renounce power “in the future” by not “intending” to stand for the elections for a seventh period.

Politicians resort to the legend of the ruler who “renounces power” so that his promise could not be understood as an offer of negotiation with the protesters. Such discourse segregates the promise from the context of the uprising and

attributes it to a preceding historical moment in an attempt to conceal the pressures of the rhetorical coercion.

The ruler resorts to the rhetoric of renouncing power in three crucial contexts. The first is the diligent endeavor of power acquisition, in which the endeavor is concealed by reluctance in accepting it and insistence on its demerits<sup>viii</sup>. The second context is the possibility of losing power and rallying people around its loss by showing a willingness to renounce it.<sup>ix</sup> The third context is the possibility of becoming forced to renounce it and rallying the people around the initiative by showing a lack of desire to stay in power. Rhetoric has a major impact on the people with short-term memories, people who would rather believe fabrications and often ignore their previous experiences.

#### **Combining personal and national history (or “narrative”)**

The third major aspect of self-praise is narrating the glorious deeds of the president. The three addresses are full of long sentences in which the president lists his great services to the country, mixing his personal history with the nation’s.

The narratives begin in the January 28 address with a brief note that is elaborated further in the subsequent two addresses: "I am not talking to you today as a president, but as a mere Egyptian whose destiny was to shoulder the responsibility of this country and who served his nation in war and peace."

This sentence uses the rhetorical abstraction technique by creating a text body parallel to the first person and united with it. This gives the president two identities: a personal identity and an official one. Abstraction often strengthens the intimate ties between the audience and the speaker, who becomes a mere Egyptian citizen who took responsibility by a divine order.

In the same sentence, abstraction is supported by the shifting from first person to third person pronouns. Narrating in the third person gives the speaker a higher level of credibility, often acquired by one who describes the situation as a witness and sets a textual space between the third person and the first person. This also reduces the risk

of being accused of boasting. The February 1 address represents the peak of the rhetorical employment of narrating the personal glorious deeds, thus it deserves a close analysis.

#### Rhetorical confluence: the art of disabling critical faculties

On Wednesday morning, February 1, 2011, Egypt experienced a tragic moment of division. The day before was the first million-person protest in Tahrir Square. However, the confidence of the protesters was on the verge of disappearing as a result to the gear of political language. Mubarak's address on February 1 destroyed much of the protesters' popularity and turned the balance of power as Egyptians who did not participate in the protests started to support the scenario of keeping Mubarak in power. I argue that the tactic of listing his personal glorious deeds played a big role in affecting this change.

The address devoted two paragraphs, almost a quarter of the whole address (185 of 725 words), to listing Mubarak's personal glorious deeds. This section had a significant effect on the course of the rhetorical conflict between the protesters and the regime.<sup>x</sup> The second paragraph in particular became an icon of Mubarak's three addresses:

"..... Hosni Mubarak who speaks to you today... is proud of the long years he spent... serving Egypt and her people. This country... the dear one... is my country... as it is the homeland of every Egyptian man and woman. In this country I lived... and for it I fought... I defended its land, sovereignty and interests... and on its land, I shall die... Then history will judge me and others and will tell the good deeds and the offences"<sup>xi</sup>

These sentences are full of rhetorical devices, among them abstraction, using the proper name instead of the pronoun ("Hosni Mubarak" instead of "I"), and shifting from the third person ("speaks," "is proud of") to the first person ("my country," "I lived," "I fought," "I defended"). Claptraps are also used to draw the applause of the audiences (Atkinson, pp. 53-75). There are two three-part lists; ((1) I lived, (2) I fought, (3) I defended), and; (I defended its (1) land, (2) sovereignty, (3) interests). There are also three contrastive pairs which result in extended semantic parallelism: (In this country I

lived, and on its land I will die), (history will judge me and others), and (will tell the good deeds and the offences)<sup>xii</sup>.

The fifty-word-paragraph contains three rhythmic styles. The first is the rhyme heard in *'shtu* (I lived) and *Amotu* (will die); *'lai* (on me) and *ghairai* (others); *lana* (the good deeds) and *'alina* (the offences) and *siadatehi* (sovereignty) and *masalehi* (interests). The second is the use of rhymed structural parallelism in *Harabt min Aglehi* (For it I fought) and *dafa'tu 'an ardehi* (defended its land). The two successive sentences, with the omission of the coupling *waw*, form a metric line following the *magzoo' albaset* meter (*mostaf'ln fa'ln, mostaf'ln fa'ln*). The third is the appropriate division seen in the phrase *'lai wa 'ala ghairi* (me and others) and *ma lana wa ma 'alina* (the good deeds and offences). This paragraph also contains an uncommon structure in everyday language: fronting the object as in *fihī 'shet* (In it I lived) and *'la ardihi amoot* (on its land will die). With this feature, the nation is placed in the forefront while life and death are relegated to the background. A repetitive rhythm is also created by the rhyme that Mubarak depends upon in his mastered expressive performance of the paragraph.

Furthermore, the sound performance of the paragraph has contributed to highlighting its heavy rhythm. On pronouncing it, the paragraph was divided into sixteen parts separated by short periods of silence (of an average length of one second). As expected, the periods of silence occurred with similar sound endings (the rhyme) and the intervals separating the parts carrying structural or sound parallelism. The speaker's tone rises, however, in the statements with semantic acoustic parallelism *'alai, 'ala ghairi* (on me and others) and *ma lana wa ma 'alina* (the good deeds and the offences).

Such rhetorical concentration built on semantic, structural and sound parallelisms changes the peculiar nature of the sentence. The rhythmic concentration created by parallelisms leads to the dominance of the emotive function rendering the audience unable to find a relation between the statement and reality (as is the case with the referential and cognitive functions) or to become



acquainted with its content (as is the case with the explanatory function which is a typical feature of political discourse).<sup>xiii</sup> Instead, the audience becomes engaged in the rhythms and embellishments, while critical perception recedes. This goal explains the excessive use of claptraps meant to make the audience accept and become convinced of what is said.

Part of the address's effectiveness lies in its dialogue nature, whereby Mubarak responds indirectly to the arguments of the protestors in Tahrir. In Bakhtin's words, the address is a conversation, although only one person is speaking, and it is a conversation of the most intense kind, for each present, uttered word responds and reacts with its every fiber to the invisible speaker, points to something outside itself, beyond its own limits, to the unspoken words of another person'. (Bakhtin, 1988: 197). Accordingly, Mubarak's insistence on staying in Egypt is a direct reply to the protestor's calls for his departure, and his praising of his services is a refutation of their argument that he is a demon whose reign was dominated by corruption.

**The dominance of the emotive function: 'I' as the focus of the discourse**

The wide space that Mubarak allocates for self-praise in the three addresses, affects the subject-verb attribution. Most of the verbal structures are used with the pronoun 'Ana' (lit. I) or 'taa' *almotakalem*' (first person singular pronoun for past tense verbs in Arabic). In contrast, there is a minimal use of the pronoun 'kom' (second person plural pronoun). This is illustrated in the following table, which shows the numbers of pronouns used in reference to the speaker and the addressees in the three addresses.

Pronoun/ Address	First Person singular	First Person plural	Second person	Total
28 <sup>th</sup> Jan address	37	34	5	76
1 <sup>st</sup> Feb address	48	12	3	63
10 <sup>th</sup> Feb address	84	43	16	143
Total	169	89	24	282

The table shows the dominance of the first person singular pronoun in the three addresses, as it amounts for twice the number of first person plural pronouns used and almost seven times the number of second person pronouns. This shows the tendency of making the speaker himself the focus of the address, which corresponds with the notion of the ruler's centrality in autocratic regimes. That form of centrality is manifested in the expression '*Ana al dawla*' (lit. I am the state), where '*Ana*' (I) refers to the ruler.<sup>xiv</sup> In fact, most of the actions that are usually a product of the whole regime (like the economic reforms) are attributed to the president personally. However, the first person plural pronoun 'we' is used in most cases to refer to the people together with the president as in the January 28 address: "Together, we have gone through hard times, when we, as one nation, focused on our objectives and developed our way'. Usually, the 'we' used here refers to a group of people vis à vis a third person pronoun that could be referring to 'chaos', 'Deterioration' or the group of people who caused it, that is, 'the protesters.'

The above table leads us to another observation. The address delivered on February 1 contains the most first person singular pronouns as opposed to first person plural pronouns (four to one, which is double the average ratio in the three addresses). That address had a great effect on a wide range of Egyptians, especially those who did not take part in the protests. This could be attributed to two main factors: the use of rhetoric that could be described as fatherly as well as rural in terms of touching upon the family code of ethics,<sup>xv</sup> and the use of the first person singular pronouns in creating a pattern different from the one the people got accustomed to in Mubarak's addresses. This time, Mubarak addresses the people as an 'ordinary man,' intimately revealing his sense of pain. The address is an exceptional moment against the backdrop of a long history of Mubarak's political discourse. For the first time, Egyptians see him take off his authoritarian cloak momentarily, arousing their emotions in a fatherly, yet haughty manner.

The distribution of pronouns throughout the text fosters the state of disclosure and intimacy that is nonetheless related to self-praise. The

paragraphs of self-praise contain 25 personal singular pronouns from a total of 48 pronouns. The first paragraph starts with, 'I never sought power....' and ends with, 'respects the constitution', whereas the second paragraphs starts with, 'Hosni Mubarak is....' and ends with, 'our rights and our obligations.' These two paragraphs constitute almost one third of the whole address, which shows that the ratio of personal singular pronouns used in the parts of self-praise to those used in the rest of the address is nearly three to one. This fosters the prominence of Mubarak as one person vis à vis the Egyptian people as a whole.

The dominance of the 'I' pronoun throughout the three addresses signals the dominance of the effective/emotive function, which according to Roman Jakobson, results from the relationship between the pronouns dominating a certain text and the functions they perform. The emotive function, according to this viewpoint, aims at "directly expressing the speaker's stance as to the topic being tackled. It tends to create an impression about a certain emotive stance that could be honest or deceptive" (Jakobson, p.28). The objective of that impression is to arouse the feelings of the addressee to adopt the speaker's emotive stance; this is called the emotive function of language.

It is clear that the address delivered on February 1, in which the emotive language dominates the entire text, achieved the emotive effect on the audience more than the other two addresses. That address is loaded with emotions, allowing Mubarak to gain the sympathy of Egyptians, even some of those who were opposing him.<sup>xvi</sup> However, the emotive language cannot achieve the same effect on the same audience twice. Therefore, when Mubarak uses the same tactic in the February 10 address, he gained nothing but the audience's resentment. How can this be accounted for?

The February 10 address was a poem of self-praise, in which long sentences were allocated for Mubarak's 'achievements,' 'sacrifices' and 'personal attributes.' In the meantime, the revolutionary discourse was dominated by structures that establish links between the president and the organized plundering of the country's

wealth, the systematic destruction of its capacities, and the persistent waste of its future.

That address effected a radical change of Mubarak's image in the eyes of most Egyptians. Here it is important to take into consideration the phenomenon known as 'the boomerang effect,' which posits that when emotionally charged language is used excessively or inappropriately, it can repel the audience (De Rosa, 162-178). Therefore, this address in which the president hails his personal attributes during a time of national crisis led to drastically opposite effects. As opposed to the astonished silence that pervaded the audience in Tahrir Square during the February 1 address, there were instant negative responses as the address was delivered on February 10. Of specific interest is the timing of the beginning and the escalation of those responses.<sup>xvii</sup>

For the first seven minutes of the address, the audience listens in silence. As soon as Mubarak finishes the sentence "by way of peaceful transition of authority from now till September," which alludes to the prospect that he will remain in power for nine more months, the audience interrupts for a few seconds before silence pervades the atmosphere again. As Mubarak continues to talk about the constitutional amendments, infrequent and unclear voices interrupt repeatedly and many shoes are raised to show the audience's resentment at what is being said. Subsequently, Egyptians start shouting, 'he should leave...we're not leaving' and 'go away.' When Mubarak says 'the present moment is not about me, it is not about Hosni Mubarak.' the shouts from the crowd become sporadic and unclear. As soon as Mubarak starts the longest paragraph of the address, the people start shouting 'Leave!' and their voices become louder than the live broadcasting of the address at the square. The shouts continue and others are heard, among them 'Down with Mubarak' and 'he should leave...we're not leaving'. For four minutes and fifty seconds, the time it took Mubarak to finish the paragraph, the crowds continue to shout and do not stop until the end of the address.

The shouts and symbols raised in defiance of Mubarak's address reflect the fact that the people in Tahrir Square reached a state of saturation from the self-praise discourse and could not stand any

more of it.<sup>xviii</sup> The effect of the emotional and/or emotive manipulation is usually short-term and fragile as it does not affect the deep-rooted beliefs and therefore it did not affect a broad range of protesters. Moreover, the feelings of sympathy and empathy soon recede and the addressee moves on to critical thinking of what has been said, measuring the words against the backdrop of reality. In addition, the addressee recalls history to think critically about what was emotionally affective; accepting what seems to be a sound argument and refusing the rest. However, those emotions of sympathy evaporate when the cloak of 'the victim' falls off the speaker and the claws of 'the hunter' appear to the audience. This is exactly what happened after the violence that the Tahrir protesters were subjected to, in what later came to be known as 'the camel battle.' That physical terrorism was not in any way less dangerous than the linguistic terror Egyptians were subjected to in those three addresses, which was created by manipulating the past and the future.

#### **Paradise of the past: history fuels the uprising**

Protesters often employ the ugly history of the existing regime as a stimulus for their protests. Consequently, the discourse is manipulated in the course of a fierce battle between the ruling authority and the rebels whereby each side seeks to circulate its own narratives of the past. Naturally, the protesters' discourses depict the regime's past as a dominating hell and the future—if the uprising succeeds—as a promised paradise. The ruling authority, on the other hand, immortalizes the history it has written, portrays melancholic images of a future devoid of it, and pictures another dazzlingly prosperous one under its wing, if it succeeds in surviving and extending its rule. Thus, the scenarios of the past and the future become effective weapons in battles of rhetoric whose aim is to affect the present.

Narratives of the past have vital rhetorical functions, such as granting legitimacy to the conflicting forces or dispossessing them of it; justifying their actions; attracting supporters and rallying them; and shaking the stances of opponents. Moreover, illustrating the "time-honored past" in Mubarak's discourse is a means of "self-praise". This

discourse might be called "the narratives of accomplishments," the backbone of Mubarak's self-praise. Those narratives played a significant role in supporting his attempts to retain power and in resisting what might be called "the narratives of defamation," the outcome of the rebels' discourse. The narratives of defamation are embodied in protesters' cheers, banners, jokes, and poems scathingly criticizing Mubarak's character, credibility and financial appetite.<sup>xix</sup> Furthermore, the narratives of accomplishments seek to win the sympathy of non-aligned groups and incite them against the protesters, who, in the course of shifting the Egyptians' perspective of events from political to ethical concerns, have become "ungrateful." It is solely within this ethical perspective that one can understand Mubarak's statement in his last address: "It pains me to see how some of my countrymen are treating me today."

Orwell writes in his enduring novel *1984*, "Who controls the past...controls the future: who controls the present controls the past" (32). If the uprising is an act of conflict among those who seek control over representations of the past so as to control the present, it is also an arena for another conflict over scenarios of the future. Therefore, in the stability-uprising equation, the conflict over monopolizing effective scenarios of the future is no less important than the conflict over effective interpretations of the past.

#### **Fear of the future: mechanisms of manipulating the future**

The uprising is a violent bet on the future. In the arena of rhetorical battles between the ruling authority and the revolutionary forces, scenarios of the future become a destructive weapon. Scenarios of the unknown, chaos and regression were set in opposition to the will for change, especially in the January 28 address, which used fear of the unknown future to oppose protests. Therefore, it is not unusual that the word "future" was the most recurrent word in the address on the lexical level. It appeared eight times throughout the address. In addition, the addresses are based on a contrastive duality of many varieties. The future is embodied in the most obvious structural features of the three addresses—the duality of keeping the status quo and

the demands for radical change. I shall argue, hereafter, that scenarios of the future are produced through an embodiment of the contrast between those dualities. Thus, the future turns into a number of concrete creatures, effective within an integrated figurative scenario. I shall also argue that the embodiment of the future is to achieve specific rhetorical goals, which are closely related to changing the attitudes of Egyptians with regard to the desire of change.<sup>xx</sup>

Change (The Uprising) <sup>xxi</sup>	Stretching the Rule of the Regime
Chaos	Stability
The Unknown	The Future
Fear/Anxiety/Worry/Obsessions	Security
Relapse	Accomplishments
Ruins	Gains
Anarchy	Freedom
Deconstruction	Construction
Violence	Reform
Democracy	Stability
Personal Agendas	Interests of the Nation

Figure (2) Dual Varieties (Stretching the Rule of the Regime/Change) in Mubarak's Addresses

These contrastive dualities are scattered throughout the three addresses, the greatest bulk of which can be detected in the January 28 address. These dualities appear in an overtly contrastive form, such as in the chaos/stability duality: "The critical situation, occurring in the past few days, forces us all as a people and leadership to choose chaos or stability;" or in a more tacit contrastive form, such as in the democracy/stability duality: "They have neither achieved democracy nor retained stability."

The list of dualities in Figure 2 reveals that the addresses connect a series of negative features to the uprising in two ways. The first is to make the uprising responsible for subsequent events such as security chaos and the ensuing intimidation. The second is maintaining a connection between the uprising and dreadful future scenarios. By suggesting that the current incidents are but an omen of the

future proposed by the uprising, the dreadful incidents of the present merge with a bleak scenario of the future.

The imagery of sickness is also employed to depict those dualities, such as "relapse" as in "to become ill or start behaving badly again, after making an improvement" which describes the future. In contrast, the accomplishments of the regime are depicted as "recovering from a sickness." The future of change is figuratively depicted as "falling into an abyss," which is best exemplified when Mubarak warns, "We must beware of several examples of nations that glided into chaos and relapse." It is also exemplified in the Egyptians' fear of being carried away with "more violence, more chaos, more destruction and vandalizing." The responsibility of the president is to prevent this falling/gliding/being carried away "by means of preserving the security and stability of Egypt, and protecting it from sliding into dangerous pits." As for the future, it has been objectified in the image of "precious possessions" or gains that the uprising threatens, when preserving it becomes "entwined with preserving the security and stability of Egypt, the homeland of a civilized and an ancient people, who do not allow their gains and aspirations to go in vain."

The addresses personify the future as an evil person who brings forth disturbance, anxiety, obsessions and fear "to themselves, to their families, and to the future and fate of their homeland." Fear about the future is depicted as a dreadful monster, for "the incidents of today and the past few days have thrown fear into the hearts of the greatest majority of the people for Egypt and its future." Thus, the responsibility of the president is to combat that monster, and he did, promising that "I shall never ever allow this to happen. I shall never allow fear to capture the hearts of our citizens, to cast its shadows on our fate and future."

The metaphorical scenario of the horrifying monster is presented as follows: there are unnamed, evil forces inside and outside the society that seek to dispossess Egyptians of their accomplishments and to jeopardize their future. These invisible forces have no good cause, but rather are driven by their greed and other personal

interests. Those forces have the capability of exposing youth to danger and using them unfairly for their own benefit, since “the protests have diverged from their civilized route of practicing one’s freedom of expression to become sorrowful clashes driven and dominated by political forces that sought the escalation of events and added fuel to flames.” These evil forces have succeeded in spreading chaos and fear to an extent that necessitates rescuing the homeland from falling into an abyss, because “the security and stability of the homeland have been susceptible to riots, incitement, highway robbery and looting, setting fire, attacking private and public property, and interrupting some diplomatic missions in Egypt.” Thus, the nation needs a “savior”—the president—who can remove the forces of evil with the aid of his previous experiences: “We have undergone hard times before, which we have also overcome together, when we faced them as one nation and one people.” Not only does he have the experience of handling difficult situations, but he also possesses the necessary authority to overcome them, because “This is the responsibility and the trust endowed, for which I have sworn an oath before God and the nation to shoulder and safeguard.” The savior’s aim is not to retain his throne, for he has spent his life “deploying his efforts in this country during the days of peace and war,” and he has performed his heroic role in saving the homeland, for which “I have spent the years of my life defending its land and safeguarding its sovereignty.”

The previous scenario is consistent with a rich repertoire established through movies, religious narratives, folk stories as well as historical narratives depicting the so-called savior, who combats and destroys forces of evil.

Therefore, it is natural that the metaphorical scenario is a basic rhetorical device in representing the future, because the future is an abstract concept that cannot be comprehended except via concrete experiences, such as the loss of precious things. Such negative embodiment of the protesters’ future in Mubarak’s addresses leads to unrestrained interpretations that nurture grim fears of the unknown. Those fears of the future, which coincided with unleashing criminals on the streets,

were meant to dishearten the protestors and transform the sympathy the silent majority felt for the protestors into rejection and animosity. However, the protesters’ discourse succeeded in confining the fear of the future change scenario to the ruling regime. Public opinion circulated news about the regime’s responsibility for launching this campaign of horror against Egyptians. Thus, the scheme plotted to dissolve the uprising came back to destroy the regime.

#### **Conclusion: Wars of rhetoric**

This paper has traced the most significant tactics the discourse of power employed in the arena of the Egyptian uprising. To attain more insight into these tactics and to analyze their performance mechanisms, a number of discursive features have been examined. For instance, the technique of writing addresses and controlling the contexts of their reception; lexical and syntactic devices, such as linguistic levels and traditional structures; rhythmic devices, such as grammatical parallelism, poetic rhyme and fine stanzaic segmentation; content devices, such as topics of self-praise; and conceptual devices, such as illustrations of the past and scenarios of the future.

These clever tactics were a part of a fierce war of rhetoric between the discourse of authority and the discourse of the uprising. On the battlefield, both sides exchanged strikes. Protesters waged demonstrations and discourses of protest against the ruling regime which responded with a presidential address to tighten its grip on the context of discourse production and distribution. The regime, moreover, maneuvered the protestors using the brilliance of the past and the scenarios of a future full of intimidation to abort their uprising. However, protestors gradually shook fear from their souls, weakness from their bodies, and paralysis from their minds and responded with more demonstrations, sit-ins and an uncompromising revolutionary discourse. Consequently, the president responded with an address of enchanting words, a sympathetic fatherly mask and self-praise. When signs of people’s numbness appeared as a result of the bewitching discourse, the fangs concealed beneath the mask manifested themselves, rhetoric withdrew into a corner and

camels and horses occupied the physical space of protest in Tahrir Square. As the protestors withstood the attack—in a trench, behind the shielding dream of freedom, facing the atrocities of the compassionate father—their discourse teemed with humor, jokes and paradox. Eventually, the last presidential address attempted to enter a new battle using old tactics, which merely reaped rage, provocation and the fall of the regime.

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#### Notes:

<sup>1</sup>The addresses that Mubarak gave present a terminological problem. The Egyptian official media used threetermsto refer to such addresses: (1) "address," which typically describes this discursiveevent, though the Arabic word can be confused with "word;"(2) "speech," which in Arabic can also be confused with "discourse" in the sense

used in this research; and (3) "statement," which is not worth mentioning since it was not used widely.

<sup>ii</sup>Dunne (2003. P.9) says that Usama Al-Baz, the political consultant of the ex-president for more than two decades, once sought advice on how to ameliorate the public image of the president from an expert who said, "The president must stick to the written text because his improvised notes are always rude and offensive, and this entails treating the president in the same way."

<sup>iii</sup> For a classical description of the levels of modern standard Arabic, see Badawi, p.89-200.

<sup>iv</sup> All the texts in between quotation marks are from one Mubarak's three addresses.

<sup>v</sup> In a survey that I conducted in an Egyptian university at the beginning of April 2011, forty out of two hundred and five students said that they were not sure, after listening to that expression, whether Mubarak would run for presidency or not, due to the obscurity of the meaning of the word *antawi* and that it was the discussions and explanations that followed the address that made them understand its meaning.

<sup>vi</sup> For more information on the institutional ideas about the links between the modern Egyptian state and standard Arabic, as well as the discrepancy between the symbol that each represents, see Haeri, p.31-68.

<sup>vii</sup> Tahrir Square, the most significant public square in Cairo, witnessed an important phenomenon in the rhetorical wars between the regime and the revolution. As soon as the president ended his address, the square was filled with leaflets refuting the arguments of the address, especially those that most Egyptians seem to agree with. It is obvious that this is a form of what Bakhtin calls 'overt polemic'.

<sup>11</sup> Mubarak, in his parliamentary speech on July 21, 1993, on the occasion of his election for a third term of office, said, "In spite of the hard times I have faced and endured throughout the last two terms, the call of duty gives a man no chance to choose anything better except standing by the people during the critical circumstances, and shouldering the honor of responsibility regardless of the ordeals (...) This high-ranking post, despite the immensity of its prestige, does not mean anything to me except

toiling, studious effort and fatigue for the good of our great people. No profit, no rest, no ambition, and no greed; rather, toiling day and night to preserve this precious homeland." Accessed from: the website of State Information Service: <http://www.sis.gov.eg/ar/Story.aspx?sid=24775> Date of access: 17/8/2011.

<sup>12</sup> The most evident example of this is Nasser's stepping-down statement which was delivered four days after the June 1967 defeat.

<sup>x</sup> See, for example, a public opinion survey conducted by *Masrawy* website [http://www.masrawy.com/News/Egypt/Politics/2011/february/2/masrawy\\_reader.aspx](http://www.masrawy.com/News/Egypt/Politics/2011/february/2/masrawy_reader.aspx)

Date of access 2 Feb 2011, 11 a.m. Though electronic surveys might lack academic credibility, they still carry some significance, especially if the readers' comments are taken into account.

<sup>xi</sup> I use three successive dots (...) to indicate the short time interval (one second or less) and one dot (.) for a longer span. It is worth mentioning that this statement was preceded by a period of silence that lasted for five seconds and a tenth when Mubarak kept turning the pages – the longest period of silence which I indicated with the five dots I used in the beginning of the statement.

<sup>xii</sup> The three-part lists trap is a typical feature of Mubarak's speeches before the revolution (see Abdul-Latif, 2009, p. 157-160, 184 -186).

<sup>xiii</sup> I am using the Jacobson's theory of linguistic communication functions (Jacobson, 1960).

<sup>xiv</sup> The expression 'I am the state and the state is myself' or 'Je suis l'état. L'état, c'est moi' is attributed to the king of France, Louis the fourteenth (1643-1715).

<sup>xv</sup> For a detailed study of those arguments see Abdul-Latif (2011). How Mubarak's speeches attempted to fail the revolution: the alternating faces of the president,' Journal of 'Al-Thaqafa al-Gadida,' issue 247, April 2011, p. 20-27.

<sup>xvi</sup> Here I specifically refer to Ms Mona El Shazly, a famous TV presenter, who cried as she presented her popular live TV program 'al-Ashira Masa'an' as soon as the address ended. To watch, follow the link:

<http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=FHkVQydCtNk>

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<sup>xvii</sup> Here I rely on Al Jazeera channel's live airing of the address where the screen was divided into two parts after one minute of the beginning of the address. The first part showed the live airing of the address as broadcast by the state TV channel, and the second part was live from Tahrir Square showing the reaction of the audience as they listened to the address. The link to the address is listed in the bibliography.

<sup>xviii</sup> Those shouts from the crowd could be interpreted as a subconscious psychological trick that the people resorted to in order to stop Mubarak's voice from reaching their ears and hear their own voices instead.

<sup>xix</sup> An enormous list of these outcries, banners, slogans and jokes can be found in Ibrahim Abdul-Majid's *For Every Land there is a Birth: Tahrir Days*. Akhbar el Youm, Cairo, 2011.

<sup>xx</sup> There are few studies on the rhetorical functions of future representations in the political discourse, the most important of which is conducted by Patricia Dunmire concerning how representing the future justified the US war on Iraq and occupying it in George W. Bush's speech on October 7, 2002.

<sup>xxi</sup> The addresses used the term "change" and never used "revolution" when referring to the events, although the protestors had been frequently using such labeling even before the events. All the vocabulary in Figure 2, except "revolution" has been copied as is from the text of the three addresses.

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